Abstract. In this paper, we construct a strongly unforgeable ID-based signature scheme without random oracles.
Introduction
In 1984, Shamir [20] introduced the concept of ID-based cryptosystems, in which the private key of an entity was generated from his identity information (e.g. an e-mail address, a telephone number, etc.) and a master key of a trusted third party called a Private Key Generator (PKG). The advantage of this cryptosystem is that certificates as used in a traditional public key infrastructure can be eliminated. The first ID-based signature (IBS) scheme was proposed by Shamir [20] . Later, many IBS schemes were presented in [19, 16, 13, 8] .
For (ID-based) signatures [12, 9, 4, 7, 22, 21, 6, 17] or ID-based encryptions [3, 21] , constructing schemes whose security can be proved without random oracles is one of the most important themes of study, since commonly used hash functions such as MD5 or SHA-1 are not random oracles.
It is known that strongly unforgeable IBS schemes can be constructed with the approach of attaching certificates to strongly unforgeable (non-ID-based) signatures. This approach is mentioned in passing within several papers [10, 2, 11] .
We can construct strongly unforgeable IBS schemes without random oracles by applying the approach to strongly unforgeable signature schemes without random oracles such as the Boneh-Boyen [4] , the Zhang-Chen-Susilo-Mu [22] , the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya [7] , the Okamoto [15] or the Boneh-Shen-Waters [6] . However, these constructions need at least six signature parameters to include a public key of the signer and two ordinary signatures (one from the signer and one from the PKG).
Also, Huang-Wong-Zhao [14] proposed a general method to transform (weakly) unforgeable IBS schemes into strongly unforgeable ones by attaching strong onetime signatures. Therefore, this enables us to construct strongly unforgeable IBS schemes without random oracles by applying it on them to any unforgeable ones such as the Paterson-Schuldt [17] . However, in this transformation, signature sizes of the IBS scheme depend on the public key size and signature size of the underlying strong one-time signature scheme. Almost all the current one-time signature schemes suffer from a drawback that these signature sizes are quite large in practice. Note that a strongly unforgeable signature scheme (in the sense of Definition 2 in [14] ) is also a strong one-time signature scheme (Definition 3 in [14] ). However, by using a strongly unforgeable signature scheme such as [4, 22, 7, 15, 6] instead of the one-time signature, these constructions also need at least six signature parameters.
In this paper, we propose a strongly unforgeable IBS scheme without random oracles, with five signature parameters. The security of the scheme relies on the difficulty to solve three problems related to the Diffie-Hellman (DH) problem, and a one-way isomorphism that no PPT adversary can find the inverse one. The signature size of our scheme is smaller than that of other schemes based on varieties of the DH problem or the discrete logarithm problem. 5 One of the reasons why the number of parameters can be reduced from six to five is that our scheme is directly constructed without applying [10, 2, 11] or [14] .
The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2, we prepare for the construction of our scheme, along with its proof of security. In Section 3, we will provide two new assumptions related to the DH problem, and make a proposal for our ID-based signature scheme. We prove our scheme satisfying security of strong unforgeability in Section 4, and discuss efficiency in Section 5. We provide conclusions in Section 6.
5 Currently, the most practical strongly unforgeable signature schemes [12, 9] without random oracles are constructed based on the Strong RSA assumption. It is known that each component in the parameters of the signature and the public key generated by these schemes needs to be at least 1024-bits in size. On the other hand, it is sufficient to be 160-bits in size for signature schemes constructed based on the discrete logarithm problem (including varieties of the DH problem) over elliptic curves. In this paper, we only consider such schemes.
Preliminaries
The aim of this section is to define a one-way isomorphism, a bilinear map, the co-Diffie-Hellman (co-DH) problem, an ID-based signature scheme and the strong unforgeability.
One-Way Isomorphism and Bilinear Map
The following definitions are due to [18, 5] . We assume that -G 1 , G 2 and G T are multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p; -g 2 is a generator of
, where x ∈ Z p and g 1 is a generator of G 1 ; -e : G 1 × G 2 → G T is the cryptographic bilinear map satisfying the following properties:
There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v) for any u ∈ G 1 and any v ∈ G 2 .
The Co-Diffie-Hellman Problem
We provide the co-DH problem in (G 2 , G 1 ) as follows. Given
as input for random generators g 1 ∈ R G 1 , g 2 ∈ R G 2 and random numbers x, y ∈ R Z * p , compute g xy 1 . We say that algorithm A has an advantage ε in solving the co-DH problem in (
where the probability is over the choice g 1 ∈ R G 1 , g 2 ∈ R G 2 , x, y ∈ R Z * p and the random bits of A.
if no t-time adversary has an advantage of at least ε in solving the co-DH problem in (G 2 , G 1 ).
Notice that, if we set g 1 := f (g 2 ) ∈ G 1 for the one-way isomorphism f : G 2 → G 1 and the random generator g 2 ∈ R G 2 , then the generator g 1 is not random.
ID-based Signature Schemes
The definition of the IBS scheme in this section is due to [17] . An IBS scheme consists of four phases: Setup, Extract, Sign and Verify as follows.
Setup:
A security parameter is taken as input and returns params (system parameters) and master-key. The system parameters include a decision of a finite message space M, and a decision of a finite signature space S. Intuitively, the system parameters will be publicly known, while the master-key will be known only to the Private Key Generator (PKG). Extract: The output from Setup (params, master-key) is taken along with an arbitrary ID ∈ {0, 1} * as input, and returns a private key d. Here ID is an arbitrary string that will be used as a public key, and d is the corresponding private sign key. The Extract phase extracts a private key from the given public key, and is performed by the PKG. Sign: A message M ∈ M, a private key d and params are taken as input. It returns a signature σ ∈ S. Verify: A message M ∈ M, σ ∈ S, ID and params are taken as input. It returns valid or invalid.
The parameters in Sign and Verify are used in a different order later on. These four phases must satisfy the standard consistency constraint, namely when d is the private key generated by phase Extract when it is given ID as the public key, then
Strong Unforgeability
The definition of the strong unforgeability in this section is due to [4, 6, 17] . In particular, Paterson-Schuldt [17] defined the unforgeability and the strong unforgeability. However, their construction of the IBS scheme satisfied only the unforgeability. Strong unforgeability is defined using the following game between a challenger B and an adversary A:
The challenger B takes a security parameter k and runs the Setup phase of the IBS scheme. It gives the adversary A the resulting system parameters params. It keeps the master-key to itself. Queries: The adversary A adaptively makes a number of different queries to the challenger B. Each query can be one of the following. We define AdvSig A to be the probability that A wins the above game, taken over the coin tosses made by B and A. Definition 1. An adversary A (q e , q s , t, ε)-breaks an ID-based signature (IBS) scheme if A runs in a time of at most t, A makes at most q e Extract Queries, at most q s Signature Queries, and AdvSig A is at least ε. An IBS scheme is (q e , q s , t, ε)-strongly existential unforgeable under an adaptive chosen message attack, strongly unforgeable, if no adversary (q e , q s , t, ε)-breaks it.
Our Scheme
In this section, we provide two new assumptions and propose an IBS scheme.
Underlying Proposed Problems
We provide Assumptions 2 and 3 related to the DH problem.
The first problem is defined as follows. Given
for some r * ∈ Z * p and r * / ∈ {r 1 , . . . , r q }. Note that the index x + 1/r i means x + (1/r i ). We say that algorithm A has an advantage ε in solving the first problem if
where the probability is over the choice The second problem is defined as follows. Given
for some r * ∈ Z {r 1 , . . . , r q }. We say that algorithm A has an advantage ε in solving the second problem if
where the probability is over the choice If we set g 1 := f (g 2 ) ∈ G 1 for the one-way isomorphism f : G 2 → G 1 and the random generator g 2 ∈ R G 2 , then the generator g 1 is not random in the two assumptions. The existence of f was proved by Saito-Hoshino-UchiyamaKobayashi [18] , on multiplicative cyclic groups constructed on non-supersingular elliptic curves. Security of our scheme is essentially based on the co-DH assumption, our proposed two assumptions, and the isomorphism f . In particular, our proposed two assumptions which are defined in a rigorous manner contribute to prove the security of strong unforgeability for our scheme.
Scheme
We shall give an IBS scheme. This scheme consists of four phases: Setup, Extract, Sign and Verify. For the moment we shall assume that the identity ID are elements in {0, 1}
n1 , but the domain can be extended to all of {0, 1} * using a collision-resistant hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n1 . Similarly, we shall assume that the signature message M to be signed are elements in {0, 1} n2 .
Setup:
The PKG chooses multiplicative cyclic groups G 1 , G 2 and G T of sufficiently large prime order p, a random generator g 2 of G 2 , the one-way isomorphism f : G 2 → G 1 with g 1 := f (g 2 ), and the cryptographic bilinear map e :
Also he generates u := g
2 for random numbers x , x 1 , . . . , x n1 , y , y 1 , . . . , y n2 ∈ R Z * p . The master secret master-key is M K and the public parameter are
Extract: Let ID be an n 1 -bit identity and id k (k = 1, . . . , n 1 ) denote the kth bit of ID. To generate a private key d ID for ID ∈ {0, 1} n1 , the PKG picks a random number s ∈ R Z * p , and computes
Sign: Let M be an n 2 -bit signature message to be signed and m k (k = 1, . . . , n 2 ) denote the kth bit of M . A signature σ := (σ 1 , . . . , σ 5 ) of (ID, M ) is generated as follows.
If the equalities hold the result is valid; otherwise the result is invalid.
If an entity with identity ID constructs a signature σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ 5 ) on a message M as described in the Sign phase above, it is easy to see that σ will be accepted by a verifier:
Thus the scheme is correct. An outline of our proof is as follows. Suppose that there exists an adversary, A, who breaks our IBS scheme in Section 3, and a challenger, B, takes the Assumption II challenge. After A and B execute the strongly unforgeable game, A outputs a valid tuple for an identity, a message and a signature. Then B will compute the Assumption II response which is valid. The tuple from A must not contradict the co-DH assumption and the Assumption III .
Proof. Suppose that there exists an adversary, A, who (q e , q s , t, ε)-breaks our IBS scheme. We construct a simulator, B, to play the Assumption II game. The simulator B will take the Assumption II challenge
, and run A executing the following steps.
Simulator Description
Setup: The simulator B generates u := g 
Queries: The adversary A adaptively makes a number of different queries to the challenger B.
Assume that U e is the subscript set of identities in Extract Queries, U s is that of identities in Signature Queries, U := U e ∪ U s , and M i s is that of messages in Signature Queries for the ID i (i ∈ U s ).
Each query can be one of the following.
-Extract Queries:
The adversary A adaptively issues Extract Queries ID i (i ∈ U e ). Assume that
where
, B aborts this game.
(4.1-E2) Otherwise (i.e. X i ≡ 0 (mod p)), B does not abort the game, and
and sends it to A. Here (2), we can regard all s i ∈ R Z * p as random numbers in (3).)
-Signature Queries:
The adversary A adaptively issues Signature Queries
. Assume that X i is from (1) for i ∈ U s and
, B aborts this game. 
and sends it to A. Here 
Artificial Abort: Assume that 
Analysis
The adversary A cannot distinguish the above game from Simulator Description with the abort when
and Y i,j ≡ 0 (mod p), and the strongly unforgeable game without this abort, since
and this probability is negligible when q e + q s p. Thus we shall consider only the game from Simulator Description.
Since σ * is valid, we assume that 
in the case that A knows all g
). This means that U = U e = U s . Suppose that the probability (6) ≥ ε for some ε ≤ ε.
Then the probability (6) can be reduced to a contradiction of either the co-DH assumption or Assumption II . A more elaborate proof is proposed in Appendix A.
in the case that A knows x , x 1 , . . . , x n1 and g α 2 . Suppose that the probability (7) ≥ ε for ε + ε = ε.
Then the probability (7) can be reduced to a contradiction of either the co-DH assumption or Assumption III . A more elaborate proof is proposed in Appendix B.
A proof of the limited range of values (q e , q s , t, ε) is proposed in Appendix C. Therefore, we proved Theorem 1.
Efficiency
In this section, we consider efficiency of strongly unforgeable IBS schemes without random oracles.
Huang-Wong-Zhao [14] proposed a general method to transform unforgeable IBS schemes into strongly unforgeable ones by attaching strong one-time signatures. Table 1 shows efficiency of IBS schemes from the Huang-Wong-Zhao [14] . For (x r , y r ) of the row in the table, x r represents the number of signature parameters and y r that of the bilinear maps. For (x c ; y c ) of the column, x c the number of signature parameters and public keys, and y c that of the bilinear maps. For x t /y t in the table, x t (= x c + x r ) the number of signature parameters for each strongly unforgeable IBS scheme; and y t (= y c + y r ) that of the bilinear maps. Notice that we count the number of the signature parameters to be small. However, these constructions need at least six signature parameters. Also, it is known that strongly unforgeable IBS schemes can be constructed with the approach of attaching certificates to strongly unforgeable (non-IDbased) signatures. Table 2 shows efficiency of IBS schemes from this construction in [10, 2, 11] . Here, (x r , y r ) of the row, (x c ; y c ) of the column and x t /y t in this table mean the numbers such as in Table 1 .
All these constructions need at least six signature parameters. In our scheme of Section 3.2, it is sufficient to be five. On the other hand, our scheme is inefficient since the bilinear map is used six times during one iteration of verification in the scheme.
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a strongly unforgeable IBS scheme without random oracles, with five signature parameters, based on three problems related to the DH problem and a one-way isomorphism. However, our scheme is inefficient since the bilinear map (the pairing) is used six times during one iteration of verification in the scheme. Our next step is to propose more efficient schemes with the same security (or we have a possibility that the six times have not been a problem by a future study of the computation process rate of the bilinear map). ) .
from (6) . Also, since X * /s * ≡ X l /s l (mod p), we replace the third component of the output by
and eliminate the remaining components. Thus A has an advantage of ε in solving
where the problem is over the choice
, and the random bits of A. Set 
where the problem is over g 2 ∈ G 2 , g 1 (= f (g 2 )) ∈ G 1 , y, h ∈ R Z * p and the random bits of A. This means that A solves the co-DH problem in (G 2 , G 1 ) with a non-negligible probability. 
)
can be eliminated from (6) . These mean that the probability (6) can be deformed to a contradiction of Assumption II . and r * = r * X l /Y * , the probability (7) can be deformed to a contra
